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Abstract
Iterated regret minimization has been introduced recently
by J.Y. Halpern and R. Pass in classical strategic games.
For many games of interest, this new solution concept
provides solutions that are judged more reasonable than
solutions offered by traditional game concepts – such as
Nash equilibrium –. Although computing iterated regret
on explicit matrix game is conceptually and computa-
tionally easy, nothing is known about computing the it-
erated regret on games whose matrices are defined im-
plicitly using game tree, game DAG or, more generally
game graphs. In this paper, we investigate iterated regret
minimization for infinite duration two-player quantitative
non-zero sum games played on graphs.
We consider reachability objectives that are not neces-
sarily antagonist. Edges are weighted by integers – one
for each player –, and the payoffs are defined by the sum
of the weights along the paths. Depending on the class of
graphs, we give either polynomial or pseudo-polynomial
time algorithms to compute a strategy that minimizes the
regret for a fixed player. We finally give algorithms to
compute the strategies of the two players that minimize
the iterated regret for trees, and for graphs with strictly
positive weights only.
1 Introduction
The analysis of complex interactive systems like embed-
ded systems or distributed systems is a major challenge of
computer aided verification. Zero-sum games on graphs
provide a good framework to model interactions between
a component and an environment as they are strictly com-
petitive. However in the context of modern interactive
systems, several components may interact and be con-
trolled independently. Non-zero sum games on graphs are
more accurate to model such systems, as the objectives are
not necessarily antagonist. There are initial results in this
area but a large number of questions are open. In this pa-
per, we adapt to game graphs a new solution concept of
non-zero sum games initially defined for strategic games.
In [7], J.Y. Halpern and R. Pass defined the notion of
iterated regret minimization. This solution concept as-
sumes that instead of trying to minimize what she has
to pay, each player tries to minimize her regret. The re-
gret is informally defined as the difference between what a
player actually pays and what she could have payed if she
knew the strategy chosen by the other player. More for-
mally, if u1(λ1, λ2) represents what Player 1 pays when
the pair of strategies (λ1, λ2) is played, reg1(λ1, λ2) =
u1(λ1, λ2)−minλ′
1
u1(λ′1, λ2).
Let us illustrate this on an example. Consider the strate-
gic game defined by the matrix of figure 1. In the game
underlying this matrix, Player 1 has two strategies A1 and
B1 and Player 2 has two strategies A2 and B2. The two
players choose a strategy at the same time and the pairs of
strategies define what the two players have to pay1. The
regret of playing A1 for Player 1 if Player 2 plays A2 is
equal to 1 because u1(A1, A2) is 2 when u1(B1, A2) is
1. Knowing that Player 2 plays A2, Player 1 should have
played B1.
As Players have to choose strategies before knowing
how the adversary will play, we associate a regret with
each strategy as follows. The regret of a strategy λ1 of
Player 1 is : reg1(λ1) = maxλ2 reg1(λ1, λ2). In the
example, the regret attached to strategy A1 is equal to
1We could have considered rewards instead of penalties, everything
is symmetrical.
A2 B2
A1 (2, 1) (3, 4)
B1 (1, 2) (4, 3)
Figure 1: A strategic game with explicit penalty matrix.
1, because when Player 2 plays A2, Player 1 regret is 1,
and when Player 2 plays B2 her regret is 0. A rational
player should minimize her regret. The regret for Player
1 is thus defined as reg1 = minλ1 reg1(λ1), sum-
marizing, we get reg1 = minλ1 maxλ2(u1(λ1, λ2) −
minλ′
1
u1(λ′1, λ2)). A symmetrical definition can be given
for Player 2’s regret.
Let us come back to the example. The regret attached
to strategyB1 is equal to 1. So the two strategies of Player
1 are equivalent w.r.t. regret minimization. On the other
hand, for Player 2, the regret ofA2 equals 0, and the regret
of B2 equals 3. So, if Player 1 makes the hypothesis that
Player 2 is trying to minimize her regret, then she must
conclude that Player 2 will playA2. Knowing that, Player
1 recomputes her regret for each action, and in this case,
the regret of action A1 is 1 while the regret of B1 is 0.
So rational players minimizing their regret should end up
playing the pairs (B1, A2) in this game.
Reasoning on rationality is formalized by Halpern and
Pass by introducing a delete operator that erases strictly
dominated strategies. This operator takes sets of strate-
gies (Λ1,Λ2) for each player and returns D(Λ1,Λ2) =
(Λ′1,Λ
′
2) the strategies that minimize regret. Then
D(Λ′1,Λ
′
2) returns the strategies that minimize regret un-
der the hypothesis that adversaries minimize their regret
i.e., choose their strategies in Λ′1 and Λ′2 respectively. In
the case of finite matrix games, this operator is monotone
and converges on the strategies that minimize regrets for
the two players making the assumption of rationality of
the other player.
In this paper, we consider games where the matrix is not
given explicitly but defined implicitly by a game graph.
More precisely, we consider graphs where vertices are
partitioned into vertices that belong to Player 1 and ver-
tices that belong to Player 2. Each edge is annotated by
a penalty for Player 1 and one for Player 2. Additionally,
there are two designated sets of vertices, one that Player
1 tries to reach and the other one that Player 2 tries to
reach. The game starts in the initial vertex of the graph
and is played for an infinite number of rounds as follows.
In each round, the Player who owns the vertex on which
the pebble is placed moves the the pebble to an adjacent
vertex using an edge of the graph, and a new round starts.
The infinite plays generate an infinite sequence of vertices
and the amount that the players have to pay are computed
as follows. Player 1 pays +∞ if the sequence does not
reach the target set assigned to Player 1, otherwise she
pays the sum of edge costs assigned to her on the prefix
up to the first visit to her target set. The amount to pay
for Player 2 is defined symmetrically. Strategies in such
games are functions from the set of histories of plays (se-
quences of visited vertices) to edges (choice of moves for
the pebble).
Let us consider the game graph of Fig. 1. This is a
formalization of the so-called Centipede game [9] in our
game graphs. We have considered a 5-round variant here,
this game can be generalized to any number of rounds.
Initially, the pebble is on vertex A. Player 1 owns the cir-
cle vertices and Player 2 owns the square vertices. The
target objective for the two players is the same: they both
want to reach vertex S. At each round, one of the players
has to choose either to stop the game and reach the tar-
get, or to let the game continue for at least an additional
round. The penalties attached to edges are given as pairs
of integers (the first for Player 1 and the second for Player
2). Strategies here are as follows. For each circle ver-
tex, Player 1 must decide either to continue or to go to
the target S, and symmetrically for Player 2. It can be
shown (and computed by our algorithms) that the strat-
egy of Player 1 that survives iterated regret minimization
is the strategy that stops the game only in position E and
the strategy for Player 2 is the strategy that continue the
game to vertex D. This pair of strategy has a penalty of
(1, 3). This is an interesting and rather nice joint behavior
of the two players in comparison of what Nash equilib-
rium is predicting for this example. Indeed, the only Nash
equilibrium2 in that game is the pair of strategies where
the two players decide to stop directly the game and so
they have to pay (5, 7). This is a 5-round example but the
difference between the penalty of the Nash equilibrium
and the iterated regret grows as the number of rounds in-
creases.
2A Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies where no player has an
incentive to change her strategy if the other player keeps playing her
strategy
2
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Figure 2: Centipede Game
Contributions We investigate iterated regret minimiza-
tion for infinite duration two-player quantitative non-zero
sum games played on graphs. We focus on reachability
objectives that are not necessarily antagonist.
We first consider target-weighted arenas, where the
payoff function is defined for each state of the objectives.
We give a PTIME algorithm to compute the regret by re-
duction to a min-max game.
We then consider edge-weighted arenas. Each edge
is labeled by a pair of integers – one for each player –
, and the payoffs are defined by the sum of the weights
along the path until the first visit to an objective. We give
a pseudo-PTIME algorithm to compute the regret in an
edge-weighted arena, by reduction to a target-weighted
arena.
We also study the problem of iterated regret minimiza-
tion. We provide a delete operator that removes strictly
dominated strategies. We show how to compute the ef-
fect of iterating this operator on tree arenas and strictly
positive edge-weighted arenas. In the first case, we pro-
vide a quadratic time algorithm and in the second case, a
pseudo-exponential time algorithm.
Related works Several notions of equilibria have been
proposed in the literature for reasoning on 2-players non-
zero-sum games, for instance Nash equilibrium, sequen-
tial equilibrium, perfect equilibrium - see [8] for an
overview. Those equilibria formalize notions of rational
behavior by defining optimality criteria for pairs of strate-
gies. As we have seen in the Centipede game example [9],
or as it can be shown for other examples like the Trav-
eller’s dilemma [1], Nash equilibria sometimes suggest
pairs of strategies that are rejected by common sense. Re-
gret minimization is an alternative solution concept that
sometimes proposes more intuitive solutions and requires
more cooperation between players. Recently, non-zero
sum games played on graphs have attracted a lot of atten-
tion. There have been several papers that study Nash equi-
libria or particular classes of Nash equilibria [6, 3, 2, 4].
Proofs that are sketched or omitted in the paper are
given in Appendix.
2 Weighted Games and Regret
Given a cartesian product A × B of two sets, we de-
note by proji the i-th projection, i = 1, 2. It is nat-
urally extended to sequence of elements of A × B by
proji(c1 . . . cn) = proji(c1) . . .proji(cn). For all k ∈ N,
we let [k] = {0, . . . , k}.
Reachability Games Turn-based two-player games are
played on game arenas by two players. A (finite) game
arena is a tuple G = (S = S1 ⊎ S2, s0, T ) where S1, S2
are finite disjoint sets of player positions (S1 for Player 1
and S2 for Player 2), s0 ∈ S1 is the initial position, and
T ⊆ S × S is the transition relation. A finite play on G
of length n is a finite word π = π0π1 . . . πn ∈ S∗ such
that π0 = s0 and for all i = 0, . . . , n− 1, (πi, πi+1) ∈ T .
Infinite plays are defined similarly. We denote by Pf (G)
(resp. P∞(G)) the set of finite (resp. infinite) plays on
G, and we let P(G) = Pf (G) ∪ P∞(G). For any node
s ∈ S, we denote by (G, s) the arena G where the initial
position is s.
Let i ∈ {1, 2}. We let −i = 1 if i = 2 and −i = 2 if
i = 1. A strategy λi : Pf (G)→ S ∪ {⊥} for Player i is a
mapping that maps any finite play π whose last position –
denoted last(π) – is in Si to⊥ if there is no outgoing edge
from last(π), and to a position s such that (last(π), s) ∈ T
otherwise. The set of strategies of Player i inG is denoted
by Λi(G). Given a strategy λ−i ∈ Λ−i(G), the outcome
OutG(λi, λ−i) is a play π = π0 . . . πn . . . such that (i)
π0 = s0, (ii) if π is finite, then there is not outgoing
edge from last(π), and (iii) for all 0 ≤ j ≤ |π| and all
κ = 1, 2, if πj ∈ Sκ, then πj+1 = λκ(π0 . . . πj). We also
define OutG(λi) = {OutG(λi, λ−i) | λ−i ∈ Λ−i(G)}.
A strategy λi is memoryless if for all play π ∈ Pf (G),
λi(π) only depends on last(π). Thus λi can be seen as a
function Si 7→ S ∪ {⊥}. It is finite-memory if λi(π) only
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depends on last(π) and on some state of a finite state set.
We refer the reader to [5] for formal definitions.
A reachability winning condition (rwc for short) for
Player i is given by a subset of positions Ci ⊆ S – called
the target set –. A play π ∈ P(G) is winning for Player i
if some position of π is in Ci. A strategy λi for Player i is
winning if all the plays of OutG(λi) are winning. In this
paper, we often consider two target sets C1,C2 for Player
1 and 2 respectively. We write (S1, S2, s0, T,C1,C2)
to denote the game arena G extended with those target
sets. Finally, let λi ∈ Λi(G) be a winning strategy for
Player i and λ
−i ∈ Λ−i(G). Let π0π1 · · · ∈ P(G) be
the outcome of (λi, λ−i). The outcome of (λi, λ−i) up to
Ci is defined by OutG,Ci(λi, λ−i) = π0 . . . πn such that
n = min{j | πj ∈ Ci}. We also extend this notation to
sets of plays OutG,Ci(λi) naturally.
Weighted Games We add weights on edges of arenas
and include the target sets. A (finite) weighted game arena
is a tupleG = (S = S1⊎S2, s0, T, µ1, µ2,C1,C2) where
(S, s0, T ) is a game arena, for all i = 1, 2, µi : T → N
is a weigth function for Player i and Ci its target set. We
let MGi be the maximal weight of Player i, i.e. MGi =
maxe∈T µi(e) and MG = max(MG1 ,MG2 ).
G is a target-weighted arena (TWA for short) if only
the edges leading to a target node are weighted by strictly
positive integers, and any two edges leading to the same
node carry the same weight. Formally, for all (s, s′) ∈ T ,
if s′ 6∈ Ci, then µi(s, s′) = 0, otherwise for all (s′′, s′) ∈
T , µi(s, s
′) = µi(s
′′, s′). Thus for target-weighted are-
nas, we assume in the sequel that the weight functions
map Ci to N.
Let π = π0π1 . . . πn be a finite play in G. We extend
the weight functions to finite plays, so that for all i = 1, 2,
µi(π) =
∑n−1
j=0 µi(πj , πj+1). The utility uGi (π) of π (for
Player i) is +∞ if π is not winning for Player i, and the
sum of the weights occuring along the edges defined by π
until the first visit to a target position otherwise. Formally:
uGi (π) =
{
+∞ if π is not winning for Player i∑min{k | πk∈Ci}−1
j=0 µi(πj , πj+1) otherwise
We extend this notion to the utility of two strategies
λ1, λ2 of Player 1 and 2 respectively:
uGi (λ1, λ2) = u
G
i (OutG(λ1, λ2))
Let i ∈ {1, 2}. Given a strategy λi ∈ Λi(G), the best
response of Player −i to λi, denoted by brG
−i(λi), is the
least utility Player −i can achieve against λi. Formally:
brG
−i(λi) = min
λ
−i∈Λ−i(G)
uG
−i(λi, λ−i)
Regret Let i ∈ {1, 2} and let λ1, λ2 be two strategies of
Player 1 and 2 respectively. The regret of Player i is the
difference between the utility Player i achieves and the
best response to the strategy of Player −i. Formally:
regGi (λi, λ−i) = uGi (λi, λ−i)− br
G
i (λ−i)
Note that regGi (λi, λ−i) ≥ 0, since brGi (λ−i) ≤
uGi (λi, λ−i). The regret of a strategy λi for Player i is
the maximal regret she gets for all strategies of Player −i:
regGi (λi) = max
λ
−i∈Λ−i(G)
regGi (λi, λ−i)
Finally, the regret of Player i in G is the minimal regret
she can achieve:
regGi = min
λi∈Λi(G)
regGi (λi)
We let +∞− (+∞) = +∞.
Proposition 1. For all i = 1, 2, regGi < +∞ iff Player i
has a winning strategy.
Proof. If Player i has no winning strategy, then for all
λi ∈ Λi(G), there is λ−i ∈ Λ−i(G) s.t. uGi (λi, λ−i) =
+∞. Thus regGi (λi, λ−i) = +∞. Therefore regGi =
+∞.
If Player i has a winning strategy λi, then for all
λ
−i ∈ Λ−i(G), uGi (λi, λ−i) < +∞ and br
G
i (λ−i) ≤
uGi (λi, λ−i) < +∞. Thus regGi ≤ regGi (λi) < +∞.
Example 1. Consider the game arena G of Fig. 3. We
omit Player 2’s weights since we are interested in com-
puting the regret of Player 1. Player 1’s positions are cir-
cle nodes and Player 2’s positions are square nodes. The
target nodes are represented by double circles. The ini-
tial node is A. Let λ1 be the memoryless strategy defined
4
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Figure 3: Graph arena with a common weight function.
by λ1(B) = C and λ1(C) = E. For all λ2 ∈ Λ2(G),
OutG1 (λ1, λ2) is either ACE or ABCE, depending on
whether Player 2 goes directly to C or passes by B. In
both cases, the outcome is winning and uG1 (λ1, λ2) = 3.
What is the regret of playing λ1 for Player 1? To com-
pute reg1G(λ1), we should consider all possible strategies
of Player 2, but a simple observation allows us to restrict
this range. Indeed, to maximize the regret of Player 1,
Player 2 should cooperate in subtrees where λ1 prevents
to go, i.e. in the subtrees rooted at D and F . Therefore
we only have to consider the two following memoryless
strategies λ2 and λ′2: both λ2 and λ′2 move from F to J
and from D to H , but λ2(A) = B while λ′2(A) = C. In
both cases, going to F is a best response to λ2 and λ′2
for Player 1, i.e. brG1 (λ2) = brG1 (λ′2) = 0. Therefore we
get regG1 (λ1, λ2) = uG1 (λ1, λ2)− brG1 (λ2) = 3− 0 = 3.
Similarly regG1 (λ1, λ′2) = 3. Therefore regG1 (λ1) = 3.
As a matter of fact, the strategy λ1 minimizes the regret
of Player 1. Indeed, if she chooses to go from B to D,
then Player 2 moves from A to B and from D to G (so
that Player 1 gets a utility 3) and cooperates in the subtree
rooted at C by moving from F to J . The regret of Player
1 is therefore 3. If Player 1 moves from B to C and from
C to F , then Player 2 moves from A to C and from F to
I (so that Player 1 gets a utility 4), and from D to H , the
regret of Player 1 being therefore 4. Similarly, one can
show that all other strategies of Player 1 have a regret at
least 3. Therefore regG1 = 3.
Note that the strategy λ1 does not minimize the regret
in the subgame defined by the subtree rooted at C. In-
deed, in this subtree, Player 1 has to move from C to F ,
and the regret of doing this is 4 − 3 = 1. However the
regret of λ1 in the subtree is 3. This example illustrates a
situation where a strategy that minimizes the regret in the
whole game does not necessarily minimize the regret in
the subgames. Therefore we cannot apply a simple back-
ward algorithm to compute the regret. As we will see in
the next section, we first have to propagate some informa-
tion in the subgames.
3 Regret Minimization on Target-
Weighted Graphs
In this section, our aim is to give an algorithm to compute
the regret for Player i. This is done by reduction to a min-
max game, defined in the sequel. We say that we solve the
regret minimization problem (RMP for short) if we can
compute the minimal regret and a (finite representation of
a) strategy that achieves this value.
Minmax games Let G = (S = S1 ⊎
S2, s0, T, µ1, µ2,C1,C2) be a TWA and i = 1, 2.
We define the value minmaxGi as follows:
minmaxGi = min
λi∈Λi(G)
max
λ
−i∈Λ−i(G)
uGi (λi, λ−i)
Proposition 2. Given a TWA G =
(S, s0, T, µ1, µ2,C1,C2), i ∈ {1, 2} and K ∈ N, one
can decide in time O(|S|+ |T |) whether minmaxGi ≤ K .
The value minmaxGi and a memoryless strategy
that achieves this value can be computed in time
O(log2(M
G
i )(|S|+ |T |)).
Proof. For all j ≥ 0, we let Wj ⊆ S be the set of posi-
tions from which Player i has a strategy to reach a position
s ∈ Ci in at most j steps, such that µi(s) ≤ K and such
that she does not pass by a position s′ ∈ Ci such that
µi(s
′) > K . Formally, we denote by C>Ki the set of po-
sitions s ∈ Ci s.t. µi(s) > K . Then W0 = Ci\C>Ki and
for all j > 0, Wj =Wj−1 ∪W ∃j ∪W ∀j , where:
W ∃j = {s ∈ Si\C>Ki | ∃s′ ∈Wj−1, (s, s′) ∈ T }
W ∀j = {s ∈ S−i\C>Ki | ∀(s, s′) ∈ T, s′ ∈Wj−1}
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The sequence W0,W1, . . . converges in at most |S|
steps to a set W ∗, and minmaxGi ≤ K iff s0 ∈ W ∗.
In order to compute W ∗ in time O(|S| + |T |), we add
counters to positions that counts the number of their suc-
cessors that are not already in the current set Wj . When
adding a new node to Wj , we decrement the counter of its
predecessor by one (if it was not already 0). Let s be one
of its predecessors and c its counter value. If s ∈ Si and c
is strictly lesser than the number of its successors, s will
be added to Wj+1. If s ∈ S−i and c = 0, then all the suc-
cessors of s are in Wj , therefore s will be added to Wj+1.
Now, in order to compute the value minmaxGi , we use the
previous algorithm as the building block of a dichotomy
algorithm that starts with the maximal finite value which
can be achieve by Player i if she has a winning strategy to
its target, i.e. MGi .
If minmaxGi = +∞, then any strategy achieves this
value. Otherwise in order to extract a strategy, it suffices
to keep for each position s ∈ Wj ∩ Si, a pointer to a po-
sition s′ ∈ Wj−1 such that (s, s′) ∈ T when computing
the sequence of Wj ’s. Note that this strategy is memory-
less.
Since roles of the players are symmetric, without loss
of generality we can focus on computing the regret of
Player 1 only. Therefore we do not consider Player 2’s tar-
gets and weights. Let G = (S = S1 ⊎ S2, s0, T, µ1,C1)
be a TWA (assumed to be fixed from now on). Let
λ1 ∈ Λ1(G) be a winning strategy of Player 1 (if it exists).
Player 2 can enforce Player 1 to follow one of the paths
of OutG,C1(λ1) by choosing a suitable strategy. When
choosing a path π ∈ OutG,Ci(λ1), in order to maximize
the regret of Player 1, Player 2 cooperates (i.e. she min-
imizes the utility) if Player 1 would have deviated from
π. This leads to the notion of best alternative along a
path. Informally, the best alternative along π is the min-
imal value Player 1 could have achieved if she deviated
from π, assuming Player 2 cooperates. Since Player 2 can
enforce one of the paths of OutG,C1(λ1), to maximize the
regret of Player 1, she will choose the path π with the
highest difference between uG1 (π) and the minimal best
alternative along π. As an example consider the TWA
arena of Fig. 3. In this example, if Player 1 moves from
C to E, then along the path ACE, the best alternative is
0. Indeed, the other alternative was to go fromC to F and
in this case, Player 2 would have cooperated.
We now formally define the notion of best alternative.
Let s ∈ S1. The best value that can be achieved from s by
Player 1 when Player 2 cooperates is defined by:
bestG1 (s) = min
λ1∈Λ1(G,s)
min
λ2∈Λ2(G,s)
u(G,s)1 (λ1, λ2)
Let (s, s′) ∈ T . The best alternative of choosing s′
from s for Player 1, denoted by baG1 (s, s′), is defined as
the minimal value she could have achieved by choosing
another successor of s (assuming Player 2 cooperates).
Formally:
baG1 (s, s′) =
{
+∞ if s ∈ S2
min(s,s′′)∈T,s′′ 6=s′ bestG1 (s′′) if s ∈ S1
with min∅ = +∞. Finally, the best alternative of a
path π = s0s1 . . . sn is defined as +∞ if n = 0 and as
the minimal best alternative of the edges of π otherwise:
ba1G(π) = min
0≤j<n
ba1G(sj , sj+1)
We first transform the graph G into a graph G′ such
that all the paths that lead to a node s have the same best
alternative. This can be done since the number of best
alternatives is bounded by |C1|. The construction of G′
is done inductively by storing the best alternatives in the
positions.
Definition 1. The graph of best alternatives of G is the
TWA G′ = (S′ = S′1 ⊎ S′2, s′0, T ′, µ′1,C′1) defined by:
• S′i = Si × ([M
G
1 ] ∪ {+∞}), i = 1, 2 and s′0 =
(s0,+∞);
• for all (s, b1), (s′, b′1) ∈ S′, ((s, b1), (s′, b′1)) ∈ T ′ iff
(s, s′) ∈ T and
b′1 =
{
min(b1, baG1 (s, s′)) if s ∈ S1
b1 if s ∈ S2
• C′1 = S′1 ∩ (C1× [MG1 ]) and ∀(s, b) ∈ C′1, µ′1(s, b) =
µ1(s).
Proposition 3. For all (s, b) ∈ S′ and all finite path π in
G′ from (s0,+∞) to (s, b), baG
′
1 (π) = b.
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Because the number of best alternatives is bounded by
|C1|, the game G′ can be constructed in polynomial time:
Proposition 4. G′ can be constructed in time
O
(
(|C1|+ log2(MG1 ))× (|S|+ |T |)
)
.
Since the best alternative information depends only on
the paths, the paths of G and those of G′ are in bijection.
This bijection can be extended to strategies. In particular,
we define two mappings Φi from Λi(G) to Λi(G′), for
all i = 1, 2. For all path π = s0s1 . . . in G (finite or
infinite), we denote by B(π) the path of G′ defined by
(s0, b0)(s1, b1) . . . where b0 = +∞ and for all j > 0,
bj = ba1G(s0 . . . sj−1). The mapping B is bijective, and
its inverse corresponds to proj1.
The mapping Φi maps any strategy λi ∈ Λi(G) to a
strategy Φi(λi) ∈ Λi(G′) such that Φi(λi) behaves as
λi on the first projection of the play and adds the best
alternative information to the position. Let h ∈ S′∗
such that last(h) ∈ S′i. Let s = λi(proj1(h)). Then
Φi(λi)(h) = (s, ba1G(proj1(h).s)). The inverse mapping
Φ−1i just projects the best alternative information away.
In particular, for all λ′i ∈ Λi(G′), and all h ∈ S∗ such
that last(h) ∈ Si, Φ−1i (λi)(h) = proj1(λi(B(h))).
Then, Φi’s are bijective and Φ1 preserves the regret val-
ues:
Lemma 1. ∀λ1∈Λ1(G), regG1 (λ1)= regG
′
1 (Φ1(λ1)).
The best alternative information is crucial to com-
pute the regret. This is a global information that al-
lows us to compute the regret locally, as stated by the
next lemma. For all (s, b) ∈ C′1, we let ν1(s, b) =
µ1(s) − min(µ1(s), b). We extend ν1 to pairs of strate-
gies as usual – ν1(λ1, λ2) being infinite if λ1 is losing –.
Lemma 2. ∀λ1 ∈ Λ1(G′), regG
′
1 (λ1)= max
λ2∈Λ2(G′)
ν1(λ1, λ2).
Proof. (Sketch) It is clear if λ1 is losing. If it is win-
ning, then let λ2 which maximizes regG
′
1 (λ1) and π =
OutG
′,C1(λ1, λ2). Without changing the regret values,
we can assume that λ2 cooperates if Player 1 would
have deviated from π, i.e. λ2 minimizes the utility in
the subgames (G, s) where s is not the successor of
some element of π. The best response to λ2 is either
the value uG′1 (λ1, λ2), i.e. µ1(last(π)), or the minimal
best alternative along π. By Proposition 3, this min-
imal best alternative along π is exactly proj2(last(π)).
Therefore brG
′
1 (λ2) = min(µ
′
1(last(π)), ba1G′(π)) and
regG′1 (λ1) = ν1(last(π)) = ν1(λ1, λ2). Conversely,
for any strategy λ2 which maximizes ν1(λ1, λ2), we
can also assume without changing the value ν1(λ1, λ2)
that λ2 cooperates if Player 1 would have deviated from
OutG
′
(λ1, λ2), and we therefore have regG
′
1 (λ1, λ2) =
ν1(λ1, λ2).
We can now reduce the RMP to a min-max problem :
Lemma 3. Let H = (S′, s′0, T ′, ν1,C′1) where
S′, s′0, T
′,C′1 are defined in Definition 1. Then
regG1 = minmaxH1
Proof It is a consequence of Lemmas 1 and 2:
regG1 = min
λ1∈Λ1(G)
regG1 (λ1) (definition)
= min
λ1∈Λ1(G)
regH1 (Φ1(λ1)) (Lemma 1)
= min
λ1∈Λ1(H)
regH1 (λ1) (Lemma 1)
= min
λ1∈Λ1(H)
max
λ2∈Λ2(H)
ν1(λ1, λ2) (Lemma 2)
As a consequence of Propositions 2, 4 and Lemma 3,
we can solve the RMP on TWA’s. We first compute the
graph of best alternatives and solve a minmax game. This
gives us a memoryless strategy that achieves the minimal
regret in the graph of best alternatives. To compute a strat-
egy in the original graph, we apply the inverse mapping
Φ−11 : this gives a finite-memory strategy whose memory
is exactly the best alternative seen along the current finite
play. Therefore the needed memory is bounded by the
number of best alternatives, which is bounded by |C1|.
Theorem 1. The RMP on a TWA G = (S, s0, T, µ1,C1)
can be solved in O
(
|C1| · log2(MG1 ) · (|S|+ |T |)
)
.
4 Regret Minimization in Edge-
Weighted Graphs
In this section, we give a pseudo-polynomial time algo-
rithm to solve the RMP in weighted arenas (with weights
on edges). In a first step, we prove that if the regret is
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finite, the strategies minimizing the regret generates out-
comes whose utility is bounded by some value which de-
pends on the graph. This allows us to reduce the problem
to the RMP in a TWA, which can then be solved by the
algorithm of the previous section.
Let G = (S = S1 ⊎ S2, s0, T, µ1,C1) be a weigthed
game arena with objective C1. As in the previous section,
we assume that we want to minimize the regret of Player
1, so we omit the weight function and the target of Player
2.
Definition 2 (Bounded strategies). Let B ∈ N and λ1 ∈
Λ1(G). The strategy λ1 is bounded by B if for all λ2 ∈
Λ2(G), uG1 (λ1, λ2) ≤ B.
Note that a bounded strategy is necessarily winning,
since by definition, the utility of some outcome is infi-
nite iff it is loosing. The following lemma states that the
winning strategies that minimize the regret of Player 1 are
bounded.
Lemma 4. For all weighted arenaG = (S, s0, T, µ1,C1)
and for any strategy λ1 ∈ Λ1(G) winning in G for Player
1 that minimizes her regret, λ1 is bounded by 2MG|S|.
Proof. Since we consider reachability games, it is well-
known that if there is a winning strategy for Player 1,
there is a memoryless strategy γ1 winning for Player 1
(see for instance [5]). In particular, for all λ2 ∈ Λ2(G),
OutG,C1(γ1, λ2) does not contain twice the same posi-
tion. Indeed, if there is a loop, since the strategy is mem-
oryless, Player 2 can enforce Player 1 to take this loop
infinitely many times. Therefore for all λ2 ∈ Λ2(G),
uG1 (γ1, λ2) ≤ M
G|S|. Therefore the following holds:
(⋆) ∀λ2 ∈ Λ2(G), brG1 (λ2) ≤ MG|S|. Moreover,
regG1 (γ1) ≤ MG|S|. Indeed, let λ2 which maximizes
regG1 (γ1, λ2). Then regG1 (γ1) = uG1 (γ1, λ2) − brG1 (λ2).
Since uG1 (γ1, λ2) ≤MG|S| and 0 ≤ brG1 (λ2) ≤MG|S|,
we get regG1 (γ1) ≤MG|S|. Thus (⋆⋆) regG1 ≤MG|S|.
Finally let λ1 be a winning strategy which mini-
mizes the regret of Player 1, and λ2 ∈ Λ2(G).
We have regG1 (λ1, λ2) ≤ MG|S| (by (⋆⋆)), there-
fore uG1 (λ1, λ2) − brG1 (λ2) ≤ MG|S|, which gives
uG1 (λ1, λ2) ≤ 2M
G|S| (by (⋆)).
Let B = 2MG|S|. Thanks to Lemma 4 we can re-
duce the RMP in a weighted arena into the RMP in a
TWA. Indeed, it suffices to enrich every position of the
arena with the sum of the weights occuring along the path
used to reach this position. A position may be reachable
by several paths, therefore it will be duplicated as many
times as they are different path utilities. This may be un-
bounded, but Lemma 4 ensures that it is sufficient to sum
the weights up to B only. This may results in a larger
graph, but its size is still pseudo-polynomial (polynomial
in the maximal weight and the size of the graph).
Definition 3. Let G = (S = S1 ⊎ S2, s0, T, µ1,C1) be
a weigthed game arena. The graph of utility is the TWA
G′ = (S′ = S′1 ⊎ S
′
2, s
′
0, T
′, µ′1,C′1) defined by:
• S′i ⊆ Si × [B], i = 1, 2 and s′0 = (s0, 0);
• for all (s, u), (s′, u′) ∈ S′, ((s, u), (s′, u′)) ∈ T ′ iff
(s, s′) ∈ T and u′ = u+ µ1(s, s′) ;
• C′1 = (C1× [B])∩S′ and ∀(s, u) ∈ C′1, µ′1(s, u) = u.
We now prove that regG1 = regG
′
1 . The utility informa-
tion added to the nodes of G is uniquely determined by
the path used to reach the current position. Therefore the
strategies of both players in G can naturally be mapped to
strategies in G′. More formally, we define a mapping Φ
fromΛ1(G)∪Λ2(G) intoΛ1(G′)∪Λ2(G′). Let i ∈ {1, 2}
and λi ∈ Λi(G). Let h ∈ Pf (G′) such that last(h) ∈ S′i.
Let s = λi(proj1(h)) and u = µ1(proj1(h).s). Then
Φ(λi)(h) =
{
⊥ if u > B
(s, u) otherwise
The mapping Φ is surjective, but not necessarily in-
jective. Indeed, two strategies that behave similarly up
to an utility B are mapped to the same strategy in G′.
Let λ′i ∈ Λi(G′). Any strategy λi ∈ Λi(G) that be-
haves like λ′i (on the first projections of plays) while
the utility of the play is bounded by B is a preimage
of λ′i. Formally, for all h = s0s1 . . . sn ∈ P(G),
we let h˜ = (s0, u0)(s1, u1) . . . (sn, un) where for all j,
ui = µ1(s0 . . . sj). Then, any strategy λi ∈ Λi(G) is a
preimage of λ′i iff for all finite play h ∈ P(G) such that
last(h) ∈ Si, all s ∈ S, all u ∈ N, if λ′i(h˜) is defined and
equal to (s, u), then λi(h) = s.
Lemma 5. For all i = 1, 2, Φ(Λi(G)) = Λi(G′).
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We denote byΛ≤B1 (G) the set of strategies bounded byB.
The mapping Φ preserves the regret values for bounded
strategies:
Lemma 6. ∀λ1 ∈ Λ≤B1 (G), regG1 (λ1) = regG
′
1 (Φ(λ1)).
Proof. (Sketch) This lemma is supported by the fol-
lowing result: for all λ1 ∈ Λ1(G) and λ2 ∈
Λ2(G). If OutG
′
(Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2)) is winning for Player
1 in G′ or uG1 (λ1, λ2) ≤ B, then uG1 (λ1, λ2) =
uG
′
1 (Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2)).
Note that any strategy λ1 ∈ Λ1(G) is bounded by B iff
Φ(λ1) is winning in G′ for Player 1. We can now prove
the correctness of the reduction:
Lemma 7. regG1 = regG
′
1
Proof. Suppose that regG1 = +∞. If regG
′
1 < +∞, then
there is a strategy λ′1 ∈ Λ1(G′) winning in G′ for Player
1. By Lemma 5, λ′1 = Φ(λ1) for some λ1 ∈ Λ1(G).
Since Φ(λ1) is winning, λ1 is bounded by B, and a for-
tiori winning. Thus regG1 < +∞, which is a contradic-
tion. Therefore regG′1 = regG1 = +∞.
Suppose that regG1 < +∞. Thus there is a winning strat-
egy λ1 which minimizes the regret. By Lemma 4, λ1 is
bounded B. By Lemma 6, regG1 (λ1) = regG
′
1 (Φ(λ1)).
Thus regG1 = regG1 (λ1) = regG
′
1 (Φ(λ1)) ≥ regG
′
1 . Con-
versely, since Φ(λ1) is winning in G′, there is a win-
ning strategy γ′1 ∈ Λ1(G′) minimizing the regret. By
Lemma 5, γ′1 = Φ(γ1) for some γ1 ∈ Λ1(G). Since
Φ(γ1) is winning, γ1 is bounded by B, and by Lemma
6, regG1 (γ1) = regG
′
1 (γ
′
1). So regG1 ≤ regG1 (γ1) =
regG′1 (γ′1) = regG
′
1 .
To solve the RMP for a weighted arena G, we first con-
struct the graph of utility G′, and then apply Theorem
1, since G′ is a TWA. Correctness is ensured by Lemma
7. This returns a finite-memory strategy of G′ that min-
imizes the regret, whose memory is the best alternative
seen so far. To obtain a strategy of G minimizing the re-
gret, one applies the inverse mapping Φ−1 defined pre-
viously. This gives us a finite-memory strategy whose
memory is the utility of the current play up to MG and
the best alternative seen so far.
Theorem 2. The RMP on a weighted arena G =
(S = S1 ⊎ S2, s0, T, µ1,C1) can be solved in time
O
(
(MG)2 · log2(|S| ·M
G) · |S| · C1 · (|S|+ |T |)
)
.
5 Iterated Regret Minimization
(IRM)
In this section, we show how to compute the iterated re-
gret for tree arenas and for weighted arenas where weights
are strictly positive (by reduction to a tree arena).
Let G = (S = S1 ⊎ S2, s0, T, µ1, µ2,C1,C2) be a
weighted arena. Let i ∈ {1, 2}, Pi ⊆ Λi(G) and P−i ⊆
Λ
−i(G). The regret of Player i when she plays strategies
of Pi and when Player −i plays strategies of P−i is defined
by:
regG,Pi,P−ii = min
λi∈Pi
max
λ
−i∈P−i
uGi (λi, λ−i)− br
G,Pi
i (λ−i)
brG,Pii (λ−i) = minλ∗i∈Pi u
G
i (λ
∗
i , λ−i)
For all λi ∈ Pi and λ−i ∈ P−i, we define
regG,Pi,P−ii (λi) and reg
G,Pi,P−i
i (λi, λ−i) accordingly. We
now define the strategies of rank j, which are the one that
survived j times the deletion of strictly dominated strate-
gies. The strategies of rank 0 for Player i is Λi(G). The
strategies of rank 1 for both players are those which min-
imize their regret against strategy of rank 0. More gener-
ally, the strategies of rank j for Player i are the strategies
of rank j − 1 which minimize her regret against Player
−i’s strategies of rank j−1. Formally, strategies of rank j
are obtained via a delete operatorD : 2Λ1(G)× 2Λ2(G) →
2Λ1(G) × 2Λ2(G) such that for all P1 ⊆ Λ1(G) and all
P2 ⊆ Λ2(G),
{λ1 ∈ P1|regG,P1,P21 = regG,P1,P21 (λ1)}
D(P1, P2) = ×
{λ2 ∈ P2|regG,P2,P12 = regG,P2,P12 (λ2)}
We denote by Dj the composition of D j times.
Definition 4 (j-th regret). Let j ≥ 0. The set of strategies
of rank j for Player i is P ji = proji(Dj(Λ1(G),Λ2(G))).
The j + 1-th regret for Player i is defined by regG,j+1i =
regG,P
j
i
,P
j
−i
i . In particular, reg
G,1
i = regGi .
Proposition 5. Let i ∈ {1, 2}. For all j ≥ 0, P j+1i ⊆ P
j
i
and regG,j+1i ≤ reg
G,j
i .
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Proof. (Sketch) P j+1i ⊆ P ji is by definition the operator
D. For all λ
−i ∈ P
j
−i, br
G,P
j+1
i (λ
−i) ≥ brG,P
j
i (λ
−i) (be-
cause we minimize over less strategies). Thus for all λi ∈
P ji and λ−i ∈ P
j
−i, reg
G,j+1
i (λi, λ−i) ≤ reg
G,j
i (λi, λ−i).
Since P j+1
−i ⊆ P
j
−i, reg
G,j+1
i (λi) ≤ reg
G,j
i (λi) (because
we maximize over less strategies). Therefore regG,j+1i ≤
regG,j+1i (λi) ≤ reg
G,j
i (λi) = reg
G,j
i .
Clearly, the sequence of regrets converges:
Proposition 6. There is an integer ⋆ ≥ 1 such that for all
j ≥ ⋆, for all i ∈ {1, 2}, regG,ji = regG,⋆i .
Definition 5 (iterated regret). For all i = 1, 2, the iterated
regret of Player i is regG,⋆i .
Example 2. As we already saw in the Centipede Game
depicted on Fig. 2, the Player 1’s strategy minimizing her
regret is to stop at the last step (move from A to B, from
C to D and from E to S). Its regret value is 1. The Player
2’s strategy minimizing her regret is also to stop at the
last step, i.e. to move from B to C and from D to E,
her regret being 1. Therefore regG1 = regG,11 = 1 and
regG2 = reg
G,1
2 = 1. If Player 1 knows that Player 2 will
ultimately move to E, she can play the same strategy as
before, and her regret regG,21 is 0. Similarly regG,22 = 0.
Therefore regG,⋆1 = regG,⋆2 = 0.
5.1 IRM in Tree Arenas
In this section, we let i ∈ {1, 2} and G = (S =
S1 ⊎ S2, s0, T, µ1, µ2,C1,C2) be a finite edge-weighted
tree arena. We can transform G into a target-weighted
tree arena such that C1 = C2 (denoted by C in the se-
quel) is the set of leaves of the tree, if we allow the func-
tions µi to take the value +∞. This transformation re-
sults in a new target-weighted tree arena G′ = (S =
S1 ⊎ S2, s0, T, µ
′
1, µ
′
2,C) with the same set of states and
transitions as G and for all leaf s ∈ C, µ′i(s) = uG
′
i (π),
where π is the root-to-leave path leading to s. The time
complexity of this transformation is O(|S|).
We now assume that G = (S = S1 ⊎
S2, s0, T, µ1, µ2,C) is a target-weighted tree arena where
C is the set of leaves. Our goal is to define a delete op-
erator D such that D(G) is a subtree of G such that for
all i = 1, 2, Λi(D(G)) are the strategies of Λi(G) that
minimize regGi . In other words, any pairs of subsets of
strategies for both players in G can be represented by a
subtree of G. This is possible since all the strategies in a
tree arena are memoryless. A set of strategiesPi ⊆ Λi(G)
is therefore represented by removing fromG all the edges
(s, s′) such that there is no strategy λi ∈ Pi such that
λi(s) = s
′
. In our case, one first compute the sets of
strategies that minimize regret. This is done as in Section
3 by constructing the tree of best alternatives H (but in
this case with the best alternative of both players) and by
solving a min-max game. From H we delete all edges
that are not compatible with a strategy that minimize the
minmax value of some player. We obtain therefore a sub-
tree D(H) of H such that any strategy of H is a strategy
of D(H) for Player i iff it minimizes the minmax value
in H for Player i. By projecting away the best alterna-
tive information in D(H), we obtain a subtree D(G) of
G such that any Player i’s strategy of G is a strategy of
D(G) iff it minimizes Player i’s regret in G. We can it-
erate this process to compute the iterated regret, and we
finally obtain a subtreeD∗(G) such that any strategy ofG
minimizes the iterated regret for Player i iff it is a Player
i’s strategy in D∗(G).
Definition 6. The tree of best alternatives of G is the tree
H = (S′ = S′1 ⊎ S
′
2, s
′
0, T
′, µ′1, µ
′
2,C′) defined by:
• S′i = {(s, b1, b2) | s ∈ Si, bκ = ba
G
κ (πs), κ = 1, 2},
where πs is the path from the root s0 to s;
• s′0 = (s0,+∞, ,+∞);
• ∀s, s′ ∈ S′, (s, s′) ∈ T ′ iff (proj1(s), proj1(s′)) ∈ T
• C′ = {s ∈ S′ | proj1(s) ∈ C};
• ∀(s, b1, b2)∈C′, µ′i(s, b1, b2) = µi(s)−min(µi(s), bi).
Note that H is isomorphic to G. There is indeed a one-
to-one mapping Φ between the states of G and the states
of H : for all s ∈ S, Φ(s) is the only state s′ ∈ S′ of the
form s′ = (s, b1, b2). Moreover, this mapping is naturally
extended to strategies. Since all strategies are memory-
less, any strategy λi ∈ Λi(G) is a function Si → S. Thus,
for all s′ ∈ S′i, Φ(λi)(s′) = Φ
(
λi(Φ
−1(s′))
)
. Without
loss of generality and for a technical reason, we assume
that any strategy λi is only defined for states s ∈ Si that
are compatible with this strategy, i.e. if s is not reachable
under λi then the value of λi does not need to be defined.
The lemmas of Section 3 still hold for the tree H :
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Lemma 8. For all i ∈ {1, 2}, Φ(Λi(G)) = Λi(H) and
any strategy λi ∈ Λi(G) minimizes regGi iff Φ(λi) mini-
mizes minmaxHi . Moreover regGi = minmaxHi .
As in Section 3, the RMP on a tree arena can be
solved by min-max game. For all s ∈ S′, we de-
fine minmaxHi (s) = minmax
(H,s)
i and compute this
value by a backward induction algorithm. In particular,
minmaxHi = minmax
H
i (s
′
0) and for all s ∈ S′:
minmaxHi (s) =


µ′i(s) if s ∈ C
′
min(s,s′)∈T ′ minmaxHi (s′) if s ∈ S′i
max(s,s′)∈T ′ minmaxHi (s′) if s ∈ S′−i
Theorem 3. The RMP on a tree arena G =
(S, s0, T, µ1, µ2,C) can be solved in O (|S|).
The backward algorithm not only allows us to com-
pute minmaxHi for all i ∈ {1, 2}, but also to compute a
subtree D(H) that represents all the Player i’s strategies
that achieve this value. We actually define the operator
D in two steps. First, we remove the edges (s, s′) ∈ T ′,
such that s ∈ S′i and minmax
H
i (s
′) > minmaxHi for
all i = 1, 2. We obtain a new graph H ′ consisting of sev-
eral disconnected tree components. In particular, there are
some states no longer reachable from the root s′0. Then we
keep the connected component that contains s′0 and obtain
a new tree D(H).
Player i’s strategies in D(H) are not in the stricter
sense strategies of H , as they do not specify what to play
when Player −i leads Player i to a position that is not in
D(H). More formally, let λi be a strategy of Player i de-
fined on D(H) and λ
−i a strategy of Player −i on H . If
there is a position s ofD(H) owned by Player −i such that
λ
−i leads to s when Player i plays λi, and if λ−i(s) = s′
for some position s′ not in D(H), then λi(s′) is unde-
fined. This never happens when λi is opposed to a strategy
λ
−i of D(H), but may happen when opposed to a strategy
λ
−i of H . For this reason, we define the strategies λi of
D(H) for Player i as the strategies of H such that for all
s ∈ S′i, (s, λi(s)) is an edge of H ′. We denote again by
Λi(D(H)) this set of strategies. With this definition, any
strategy λi ∈ Λi(D(H)) is defined on its outcomes in H ,
but when opposed to any strategy λ
−i ∈ Λ−i(D(H)), its
outcomes are in D(H). Thus, when we iterate this opera-
tor, we do not need to remember H ′ and we can consider
only the tree D(H). The tree D(H) represents the strat-
egy of H that minimize the regret in the following sense:
Lemma 9. Let i ∈ {1, 2}. Let λi ∈ Λi(H);
minmaxHi (λi) = minmax
H
i iff λi ∈ Λi(D(H)).
Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
strategies minimizing the regret in G and the strategies
minimizing the minmax value in H , we can define D(G)
by applying to D(H) the isomorphism Φ−1, in other
words by projecting the best alternatives away, and by
restoring the functions µi. The set of strategies Λi(D(G))
of D(G) is defined as Φ−1(Λi(D(H))) (in other words,
these are the strategies of D(H) where we project the
best alternatives away). Let λi ∈ Λi(G), by Lemma 8,
it minimizes regGi iff Φ(λi) minimizes minmaxHi , and
by Lemma 9, iff Φ(λi) ∈ Λi(D(H)), and finally, iff
λi ∈ Λi(D(G)). D(G) represents the strategies of G
minimizing the regret in the following sense:
Lemma 10. Let i ∈ {1, 2}. Let λi ∈ Λi(G); regGi (λi) =
regGi iff λi ∈ Λi(D(G)).
We obtain a new tree D(G) whose Player i’s strate-
gies minimize the regret of Player i, for all i = 1, 2. We
can iterate the regret computation on D(G) and get the
Player i’s strategies that minimize the regret of rank 2 of
Player i, for all i = 1, 2. We continue iteration we get a
tree G′ such that D(G′) = G′. We let D0(G) = G and
Dj+1(G) = D(Dj(G)). Remind that P ji are Player i’s
strategies of G that minimize the j-th regret.
Proposition 7. Let i ∈ {1, 2} and j > 0. We have
regG,ji = reg
Dj−1(G)
i and P
j
i = Λi(D
j(G)).
Proof. (sketch) By induction on j. It is clear for j = 1
and Lemma 10 ensures the correctness of the induction.
Theorem 4. Let G = (S = S1 ⊎ S2, s0, T, µ1, µ2,C) be
a tree arena. For all i = 1, 2, the iterated regret of Player
i, regG,⋆i , can be computed in O(|S|2).
Proof. By Propositions 6 and 7, there is an integer j such
that regG,⋆i = reg
Dj(G)
i . According to the definition of
D(G), j ≤ |S| because we remove at least one edge of
the tree at each step. Since |D(G)| can be constructed in
O(|S|), the whole time complexity is O(|S|2).
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5.2 IRM in Positive Weighted Arenas
A weighted arena G is said to be positive if all edges are
weighted by strictly positive weights only. In this section,
we let G = (S = S1 ⊎ S2, s0, T, µ1, µ2,C1,C2) be a
positive weighted arena. Remind that P ji (G) is the set of
strategies that minimize regG,ji , for all j ≥ 0 and i = 1, 2.
Definition 7 (j-winning and j-bounded strategies).
Let i ∈ {1, 2} and λi ∈ Λi(G). The strategy λi is
j-winning if for all λ
−i ∈ P
j
−i(G), Out
G(λi, λ−i) is
winning. It is j-bounded by some B ≥ 0 if it is j-
winning, and for all λ
−i ∈ P
j
−i(G) and all κ ∈ {i,−i},
µκ(OutG,Ci(λi, λ−i)) ≤ B.
Note that j-boundedness differs from boundedness as
we require that the utilities of both players are bounded.
We let bG = 6(MG)3|S|. We get a similar result than the
boundedness of strategies that miminize the regret of rank
1, but for any rank:
Lemma 11. For all i = 1, 2 and all j ≥ 0, all j-winning
strategies of Player i which minimize the (j+1)-th regret
are j-bounded by bG.
Proof. (Sketch) First, if the regrets of first rank are infinite
for both players, then by definition of the iterated regret,
P 11 = Λ1(G) and P 12 = Λ2(G) and thus their regrets are
infinite at any rank. Therefore there is no winning strategy
at any rank (otherwise one of the regrets would be finite).
Suppose that the first regret of Player i is finite for some
i = 1, 2. By Lemma 4, the winning strategies minimizing
her first regret are bounded by 2MG|S|. Since the weights
are strictly positive, the lengths of the outcomes until Ci
are bounded by 2MG|S|, which allows us to bound the
utilities of Player −i until a first visit to Ci by 2(MG)2|S|.
Since P ji (G) ⊆ P 1i (G) for all j ≥ 1, the strategies of
Player i (which are necessarily winning as the regret is fi-
nite) at any rank are bounded by 2(MG)2|S|. This bound
is then used (non-trivially) to bound the winning strate-
gies of Player −i by 6(MG)3|S|. The full proof is in Ap-
pendix.
Lemma 11 allows us to reduce the problem to the it-
erated regret minimization in a weighted tree arena, by
unfolding the graph arena G up to some maximal util-
ity value. Lemma 11 suggests to take bG for this max-
imal value. However the best responses to a strategy j-
bounded by bG are not necessarily bounded by bG, but
they are necessarily j-bounded by bG · MG, since the
weights are strictly positive. Therefore we let BG =
bG ·MG and take BG as the maximal value. Since the
j-winning strategies are j-bounded by bG and the best re-
sponses are j-bounded by BG, we do not los the set of
finite plays π of G such that µG(π) ≤ K , for all i = 1, 2.
Note that PK(G) is finite since G has only strictly posi-
tive weights. The unfolding of G up to BG is naturally
defined by a tree weighted arena whose set of positions is
PBG(G).
Definition 8. Let G = (S = S1 ⊎
S2, s0, T, µ1, µ2,C1,C2) be a positive weighted
arena. The BG-unfolding of G is the weighted tree
arena G′ = (S′ = S′1 ⊎ S
′
2, s
′
0, T
′, µ′1, µ
′
2,C′1,C′2)
such that S′i = {π ∈ PBG(G) | last(π) ∈ Si} and for
all π, π′ ∈ S′, (π, π′) ∈ T ′ iff (last(π), last(π′)) ∈ T
and π′ = π.last(π′), and for all i = 1, 2, π ∈ C′i iff
last(π) ∈ Ci and µ′i(π, π′) = µi(last(π), last(π′)).
We now prove that regG,⋆i = reg
G′,⋆
i , for all i = 1, 2.
As for edge-weighted arenas, this is done by defining a
surjective mapping Φ from Λi(G) to Λi(G′). For all
i = 1, 2 and all λi ∈ Λi(G), and all π ∈ Pf (G) such
that last(π) ∈ Si, Φ(λi)(π) =⊥ if there is κ ∈ {1, 2}
such that µκ(π.λi(π)) > BG, and Φ(λi)(π) = π.λi(π)
otherwise. This mapping is surjective, but not injective,
since two strategies that behave similarly up to some util-
ity BG are mapped to the same strategy.
Lemma 12. For all j ≥ 1, Φ(P ji (G)) = P
j
i (G
′) and for
all λi ∈ P ji (G), reg
G,j
i (λi) = reg
G′,j
i (Φ(λi)).
This allows us to prove the correctness of the reduction:
Lemma 13. For all i = 1, 2, regG,⋆i = reg
G′,⋆
i .
Proof. We prove that for all j ≥ 1, regG,ji = regG
′,j
i .
Let λi ∈ P ji (G). By definition of P
j
i (G), λi minimizes
the j-th regret, so that regG,ji (λi) = reg
G,j
i . By (1),
regG,ji (λi) = reg
G,j
i (Φ(λi)). By (2), Φ(λi) ∈ P
j
i (G
′),
therefore Φ(λi) minimizes the j-th regret in G′, so that
regG
′,j
i (Φ(λi)) = reg
G′,j
i , from which we get reg
G,j
i =
regG
′,j
i .
By applying the algorithm of Section 5.1 we get:
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Theorem 5. The iterated regret for both players in a
positive weighted arena G can be computed in pseudo-
exponential time (exponential in |S|, |T | and MG).
For all i = 1, 2, the procedure of Section 5.1 returns
a finite-memory strategy λi minimizing the iterated regret
in G′ whose memory is the best alternatives seen so far by
both players. From λi we can compute a finite-memory
strategy in G minimizing the iterated regret of Player i,
the needed memory is the best alternatives seen by both
players and the current finite play up to BG. When the
utility is greater than BG, then any move is allowed.
Therefore one needs to add one more bit of memory ex-
pressing whether the utility is greater than BG.
Finally, the unfolding of the graph arena up to BG is
used to finitely represent the (potentially infinite) sets of
strategies of rank j in G. Finding such a representation
is not obvious for the full class of weighted arenas, since
before reaching its objective, a player can take a 0-cost
loop finitely many times without affecting her minimal
regret. This suggests to add fairness conditions on edges
to compute the iterated regret. This is illustrated by the
following example.
A B
C
0/0
0/0
5/0 0/5
D E
F
0/0
0/0
0/0
Figure 4: Free loops
Example 3. Consider the left example of Fig. 4. Player
1’s strategies minimizing the regret are those that pass
finitely many times by the edge (A,B) and finally move
to C. The regret is therefore 5. Similarly, the strategies
minimizing Player 2’s regret are those that pass finitely
many times by (B,A) and finally move to C. The regret
is 5 as well. The regret of rank 2 for Player 1 is 5 as well,
and the set of strategies minimizing it is also the same as
before (and similary for Player 2). Indeed, the regret of
a Player 1’s strategy that passes K times by (A,B) is 5,
since Player 2 can maximize her regret with a strategy
that passes at least K times by (B,A). Thus regG,⋆1 =
regG,⋆2 = 5.
On the right example, Player 1 has no winning strat-
egy at the first rank and her regret is +∞. However the
strategies of Player 2 minimizing her regret are the ones
that pass finitely many times through the loop. Therefore
all the strategies of Player 1 are winning at rank 2. The
iterated regret of both players is 0.
6 Conclusion
The theory of infinite qualitive non-zero sum games over
graphs is still in an initial development stage. We adapted
a new solution concept from strategic games to game
graphs, and gave algorithms to compute the regret and
iterated regret. The strategies returned by those algo-
rithms have a finite memory. One open question is to
know whether this memory is necessary. In other words,
are memoryless strategies sufficient to minimize the (iter-
ated) regret in game graphs? Another question is to de-
termine the lower bound on the complexity of (iterated)
regret minimization. Iterated regret minimization over the
full class of graphs is still open. Finally, we think that this
work can easily be extended to an n-player setting.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Missing Proofs of Section 3
Proposition 3
Proof. Proof by induction on |π|.
If |π| = 0, then baG
′
1 (π) = +∞ = b0.
We now assume that the property is true for any finite
path π in G′ from s′0 to some (s, b) of length k. Let π =
(s0, b0) . . . (sk, bk)(sk+1, bk+1) be a path of length k+1.
We have:
baG
′
1 (π)
= min0≤j<k+1 baG
′
1 (s
′
j , s
′
j+1)
= min(min0≤j<k baG
′
1 (s
′
j , s
′
j+1), ba
G′
1 (s
′
k, s
′
k+1))
= min(bk, baG
′
1 (s
′
k, s
′
k+1)) by induction hypothesis
= min(bk, baG1 (sk, sk+1)) by (⋆)
= bk+1 by definition of G′
(⋆) According to Definition 1, ∀(s, b) ∈ C′1 : µ′1(s, b) =
µ1(s). Thus ∀(s, b) ∈ S′, bestG
′
1 ((s, b)) = bestG1 (s)
and ∀ ((s, b), (s′, b′)) ∈ T ′, baG
′
1 ((s, b), (s
′, b′)) =
baG1 (s, s′).
Proposition 4
Proof. Constructing G′ is done in three steps:
1. compute all the values bestG1 (s), for all s ∈ S;
this step is equivalent to looking for the short-
est path to the objective and has a complexity of
O(log2(M
G
1 )(|S|+ |T |)).
2. compute all the values baG1 (s, s′), for all (s, s′) ∈ T
such that s ∈ S1; it can be computed with a time
complexity O(|T |)
3. construct G′ by a fixpoint algorithm; this graph has
at most |C1| × |S| states and |C1| × |T | transitions.
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Lemma 2
Proof. Let λ1 ∈ Λ1(G′). If λ1 is losing, there is a
strategy λ2 ∈ Λ2(G′) such that OutG
′
(λ1, λ2) is los-
ing. Therefore regG′1 (λ1) = regG
′
1 (λ1, λ2) = +∞ =
ν1(λ1, λ2) = maxλ2∈Λ2(G′) ν1(λ1, λ2).
Suppose that λ1 is a winning strategy and let λ2 ∈
Λ2(G
′) which maximizes regG′1 (λ1, λ2). Let π =
s0s1 . . . sn = OutG
′,C1(λ1, λ2). We define a strategy λ′2
that plays as λ2 on π and cooperates with Player 1 if she
would have deviated from π. Formally, for all h ∈ P(G′)
such that last(h) ∈ S′2, we let λ′2(h) = sj+1 if there
is j < n such that h = s0s1 . . . sj . Otherwise we let
λ′2(h) = s such that (last(h), s) ∈ T ′ and bestG
′
1 (s) is
minimal (among the successors of last(h)).
Clearly, π = OutG
′,C1(λ1, λ′2) and brG
′
1 (λ
′
2) ≤
brG
′
1 (λ2). Therefore regG
′
1 (λ1, λ2) ≤ regG
′
1 (λ1, λ
′
2).
Since λ2 maximizes the regret, we get regG
′
1 (λ1, λ2) =
regG′1 (λ1, λ′2).
The best response to λ′2 either deviates from π or not. If
the best response deviates from π at a node sj , j < n,
i.e. chooses a node s′ such that s′ 6= sj+1, then the
utility of the best response, according to the definition
of λ′2, is best1G′(s′). The best response to λ′2 mini-
mizes over all those possibilities, therefore brG
′
1 (λ
′
2) =
min(µ′1(sn),minj<n,(sj ,s′)∈T ′,s′ 6=sj+1 best
G′
1 (s
′)), i.e.
min(µ′1(sn), baG
′
1 (π)). By Proposition 3, baG
′
1 (π) =
proj2(sn). Therefore regG′1 (λ1, λ2) = regG′1 (λ1, λ′2) =
µ′1(sn) − min(µ
′
1(sn), p2(sn)) = ν1(sn). From which
we get regG′1 (λ1) ≤ maxλ2∈Λ2(G′) ν1(λ1, λ2).
Conversely, let λ2 which maximizes ν1(λ1, λ2). Since
λ1 is winning, we can define π = OutG
′,C′1(λ1, λ2).
Similarly as forth direction of the proof, one can
construct a strategy λ′2 that plays like λ2 along π
and cooperates with Player 1 when deviating from π.
Clearly, this strategy has the same outcome as λ2
and we get regG′1 (λ1, λ′2) = ν1(λ1, λ2). Finally we
have regG′1 (λ1) ≥ regG
′
1 (λ1, λ
′
2) = ν1(λ1, λ2) =
maxλ2 ν1(λ1, λ2).
Lemma 1
Proof. The mapping Φ has been defined in the paper. It
remains to prove that reg1G(λ1) = regG
′
1 (Φ1(λ1)), for all
λ1 ∈ Λ1(G).
For all λ1 ∈ Λ1(G), all λ2 ∈ Λ2(G), OutG(λ1, λ2) =
proj1(OutG
′
(Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2))). Therefore uG1 (λ1, λ2) =
uG
′
1 (Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2)).
Finally:
regG1 (λ1)
= max
λ2∈Λ2(G)
uG1 (λ1, λ2)− min
λ∗
1
∈Λ1(G)
uG1 (λ
∗
1, λ2)
= max
λ2∈Λ2(G)
uG
′
1 (Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2))− min
λ∗
1
∈Λ1(G)
uG
′
1 (Φ(λ
∗
1),Φ(λ2))
= max
λ2∈Λ2(G′)
uG1 (Φ(λ1), λ2)− min
λ∗
1
∈Λ1(G′)
uG1 (λ
∗
1, λ2)
(since Φ(Λi(G)) = Λi(G′) for all i = 1, 2)
= regG′1 (Φ(λ1))
7.2 Missing Proofs of Section 4
Lemma 6 The proof of this lemma is supported by the
following lemma, which says that under certain condi-
tions, the utility of the outcomes in G and G′ are equal
modulo Φ:
Lemma 14. Let λ1 ∈ Λ1(G) and λ2 ∈ Λ2(G). If
OutG
′
(Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2)) is winning for Player 1 in G′ or
uG1 (λ1, λ2) ≤ B, then uG1 (λ1, λ2) = uG
′
1 (Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2)).
Proof. If uG1 (λ1, λ2) ≤ B, then OutG(λ1, λ2) is win-
ning, and we let π = OutG,C1(λ1, λ2). We enrich π
with the utilities of Player 1 by defining a path π′ =
(s0, u0) . . . (sn, un) where π = s0 . . . sn and for all
j ≤ n, uj = µ
G
1 (s0 . . . sj). Since π is bounded, we
have uj ≤ B for all j ≤ n, and by definition of
G′, π′ is a path of G′. By definition of Φ we clearly
have π′ = OutG
′
(Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2)), from which we get
uG1 (λ1, λ2) = u
G′
1 (Φ(λ1),Φ(λn)).
If OutG
′
(Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2)) is winning for Player 1, we
let π′ = OutG
′,C′1(Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2)) and π = proj1(π′).
Clearly, π′ is a winning play for Player 1 in G and by
definition of Φ, π′ = OutG,C1(λ1, λ2), from which we
get the equality of the utilities.
We can now prove Lemma 6:
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Proof. (Proof of Lemma 6) Let λ2 ∈ Λ2(G) which max-
imizes regG1 (λ1, λ2), and λ∗1 be the best response to λ2.
Therefore regG1 (λ1) = uG1 (λ1, λ2) − uG1 (λ∗1, λ2). Since
λ1 is bounded by B, we have uG1 (λ1, λ2) ≤ B and
uG1 (λ
∗
1, λ2) ≤ B (since λ∗1 is at least as good as λ1). By
Lemma 14, we get uG1 (λ1, λ2) = uG
′
1 (Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2)) and
uG1 (λ
∗
1, λ2) = u
G′
1 (Φ(λ
∗
1),Φ(λ2)).
By definition of the best response, brG
′
1 (Φ(λ2)) ≤
uG
′
1 (Φ(λ
∗
1),Φ(λ2)). Therefore
regG1 (λ1) = regG1 (λ1, λ2)
= uG1 (λ1, λ2)− u
G
1 (λ
∗
1, λ2)
= uG
′
1 (Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2))− u
G′
1 (Φ(λ
∗
1),Φ(λ2))
≤ uG
′
1 (Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2))− brG
′
1 (Φ(λ2))
= regG′1 (Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2))
≤ regG′1 (Φ(λ1))
Conversely, since Φ(Λ2(G)) = Λ2(G′), there
exists λ2 ∈ Λ2(G) such that Φ(λ2) maximizes
regG′1 (Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2)). Similarly, there is λ∗1 ∈ Λ1(G)
such that Φ(λ∗1) is the best response to Φ(λ2). Since λ1 is
bounded by B, we have uG1 (λ1, λ2) ≤ B, and by Lemma
14 we get uG1 (λ1, λ2) = uG
′
1 (Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2)). Since λ1 is
winning for Player 1 and bounded by B in G, Φ(λ1) is
also winning for Player 1 in G′. Therefore Φ(λ∗1) is also
winning for Player 1 inG′ (since it does at least as good as
Φ(λ1) against Φ(λ2)). Therefore OutG
′
(Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2))
is winning for Player 1 in G′, and by Lemma 14 we get
uG1 (λ
∗
1, λ2) = u
G′
1 (Φ(λ
∗
1),Φ(λ2)). Finally:
regG′1 (Φ(λ1))
= regG′1 (Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2))
= uG
′
1 (Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2))− u
G′
1 (Φ(λ
∗
1),Φ(λ2))
= uG1 (λ1, λ2)− u
G
1 (λ
∗
1, λ2)
≤ uG1 (λ1, λ2)− brG1 (λ2)
= regG1 (λ1, λ2)
≤ regG1 (λ1)
7.3 Missing Proofs of Section 5
Lemma 8 By projecting away the best alternatives of
Player −i in H , we get a tree isomorphic to H which cor-
responds exactly to the tree of best alternatives defined in
Section 3, in which all the results stated in Lemma 8 have
been already proved. Clearly, adding the best alternatives
of the other player does not change those results.
Lemma 9
Proof. Let λi ∈ Λi(H) such that minmaxHi (λi) =
minmaxHi . Let s ∈ S′i be a position of D(H) compat-
ible with λi, i.e. such that there is λ−i ∈ Λ−i(D(H))
such that s occurs in OutD(H)(λi, λ−i). Let s′ = λi(s).
We have to prove that s′ is a position of D(H). We have
minmaxHi (s′) ≤ minmax
H
i (λi) = minmax
H
i . Indeed,
since Player −i is able to enforce Player i to go to s′ when
she plays λi, if minmaxHi (s′) > minmax
H
i , then λi does
not minimize minmaxHi . According to the definition of
the delete operator, (s, s′) is an edge of D(H). Thus s′ is
a position of D(H), and λi ∈ Λi(D(H)).
Conversely, if λi ∈ Λi(D(H)). We proceed reductio
ad absurdum.
If minmaxHi (λi) > minmax
H
i , there exists
λ
−i ∈ Λ−i(H) such that minmaxHi (λi, λ−i) =
minmaxHi (λi) > minmax
H
i . We let π = π0 . . . πn =
OutH(λi, λ−i). Let s, b1, b2 such that πn = (s, b1, b2).
Since πn ∈ C′, minmaxHi (λi) = µ′i(πn) =
minmaxHi (πn). We consider the first position πk along
π such that k < n and πk is owned by Player i, i.e.
πk ∈ S
′
i and πk+1 . . . πn−1 ∈ (S′−i)∗. This position
exists, otherwise all positions π0, . . . , πn−1 are owned
by Player −i, and therefore minmaxHi ≥ µ′i(πn) =
minmaxHi (λi), which contradicts our hypothesis. Since
λi ∈ Λi(D(H)), by definition of Λi(D(H)), (πk, πk+1)
is an edge of H ′. Since from πk+1 Player −i can en-
force Player i to go to πn (since there are only posi-
tions owned by Player −i along πk . . . πn−1), we have
minmaxHi (πk+1) ≥ minmax
H
i (πn) > minmax
H
i . Since
πk ∈ S
′
i, this contradicts the definition ofH ′ (andD(H)),
because the edge (πk, πk+1) would have been removed.
Thus minmaxHi (λi) = minmax
H
i .
Proposition 7
Proof. Proof by induction on j.
If j = 1, we have regG,1i = reg
D0(G)
i = regGi and by
Lemma 9, P 1i = Λi(D(G)).
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We assume that regG,ji = reg
Dj−1(G)
i and P
j
i =
Λi(D
j(G)). By definition, regG,j+1i = reg
G,P
j
i
,P
j
−i
i .
By induction hypothesis, P ji = Λi(Dj(G)), thus
regG,P
j
i
,P
j
−i
i = reg
Dj(G)
i = reg
G,j+1
i .
Moreover, λi ∈ P j+1i iff λi ∈ P
j
i and
regG,j+1i (λi) = reg
G,j+1
i . By induction hypoth-
esis, P ji = Λi(Dj(G)). We demonstrated that
regG,j+1i = reg
Dj(G)
i . By Lemma 9, applied to
the tree Dj(G), we have regD
j(G)
i (λi) = reg
Dj(G)
i
iff λi ∈ Λi(D(Dj(G))). By definition,
regD
j(G)
i (λi) = maxλ−i∈Λ−i(Dj(G)) reg
Dj(G)
i (λi, λ−i) =
maxλ
−i∈Λ−i(Dj(G))
(
uGi (λi, λ−i)−minλ∗i∈Λi(Dj(G))u
G
i (λ
∗
i , λ−i)
)
.
Since P ji = Λi(Dj(G)), we have reg
Dj(G)
i (λi) =
regG,j+1i (λi). So reg
G,j+1
i (λi) = reg
G,j+1
i iff
regD
j(G)
i (λi) = reg
Dj(G)
i .
Consequently, λi ∈ P j+1i iff λi ∈ Λi(Dj+1(G)).
7.4 Missing Proofs of Section 5.2
In this section, we prove several lemmas that do not ap-
pear in the paper, especially to prove Lemma 13.
Lemma 11
Proof. Suppose that there is no winning strategy for both
players in G. Therefore regG1 = reg
G,1
1 = regG2 =
regG,12 = +∞, P 11 = Λ1(G) and P 12 = Λ2(G). It is
easy to verify that there is no j-winning strategy for both
players and all ranks j.
Suppose that Player i has a winning strategy, for some
i = 1, 2. Therefore by Lemma 4, the strategies mini-
mizing the regret are bounded by 2MG|S|. Since Sij ⊆
Si0 = Λi(G) for all j ≥ 0, we get that all strategy of
Sij is bounded by 2MG|S|. Let j ≥ 0, λi ∈ Sij and
λ
−i ∈ Λ−i(G). Let π = OutG,Ci(λi, λ−i). We have
µi(π) ≤ 2M
G|S|, and since the weights are strictly
positive integers, |π| ≤ 2MG|S|. Therefore µ
−i(π) ≤
2(MG)2|S|. In other words, for all j ≥ 0, all strategy of
P ji is j-winning and j-bounded by 2(MG)2|S|.
It remains to prove that the j-winning strategies of
Player −i minimizing the (j + 1)-th regret are also j-
bounded. Let j0 ≥ 0 be the first natural number such
that P j0
−i contains a j0-winning strategy (if it exists). If
j0 = 0, then P j0
−i = Λ−i(G). If j0 > 0, then no strategy
of P j0−1
−i is (j0 − 1)-winning by definition of j0, so that
regG,j0
−i = +∞, from which we get P
j0
−i = Λ−i(G). In
both cases, we have P j0
−i = Λ−i(G).
Since after reaching her objective, Player i can play
however she wants without affecting her regret, there is
a strategy γ
−i ∈ Λ−i(G) that wins against all strategies of
P j0i and which is memoryless once Player i has reached
his objective. Formally, there is a memoryless strategy
γ′
−i : S−i → S such that for all π ∈ Pf (G) such
that last(π) ∈ S
−i, if π contains a position of C−i, then
γ
−i(π = γ
′
−i(last(π)).
Let λi ∈ P j0i . We now bound the size of
OutG,C−i(γ
−i, λi), which will provide a bound on the
utility. Let π
−i = OutG,C−i(γ−i, λi) and πi =
OutG,Ci(λi, γ−i). We consider two cases:
• if π
−i is a prefix of πi. We already know that λi
is j-bounded by 2(MG)2|S|, therefore we also get
µκ(π2) ≤ µκ(π1) ≤ 2(M
G)2|S|, for all κ = 1, 2;
• if πi is a prefix of π−i, then π−i = πiπ′i, for some
π′i. Since λi is j-bounded by 2(MG)2|S|, µκ(πi) ≤
2(MG)2|S|, for all κ = 1, 2. Since γ
−i is mem-
oryless after πi, there is no loop in π′i. Therefore
µκ(π
′
i) ≤ |S|M
G
, for all κ = 1, 2. Finally, for all
κ = 1, 2, we get µκ(π−i) = µκ(πi) + µκ(π′i) ≤
(2(MG)2 +MG)|S| ≤ 3(MG)2|S|.
In both cases, we get µκ(γ−i, λi) ≤ 3(MG)2|S|, for all
κ = 1, 2 and all λi ∈ P ji . Therefore 0 ≤ br
G
−i(λi) ≤
3(MG)2|S| (⋆), which holds for all λi ∈ P j0i . We also
get regG,j0+1
−i ≤ reg
G,j0+1
−i (γ−i) ≤ 3(M
G)2|S| (⋆⋆).
Let now λ
−i which minimizes regG,j0+1
−i and λi ∈
P j0i . Let π = Out
G,C
−i(λ
−i, λi). By (⋆⋆), we have
regG,j0+1
−i (λ−i, λi) ≤ 3(M
G)2|S|, ie
µ
−i(π) − brG,P
j0
−i
−i (λi) ≤ 2(M
G)2|S|
Since P j0
−i = Λ−i(G), br
G,P
j0
−i
−i (λi) = br
G
−i(λi). Therefore
by (⋆), we get brG,P
j0
−i
−i (λi) ≤ 3(M
G)2|S|, and µ
−i(π) ≤
6(MG)2|S|. The weights being strictly positive, we get
µi(π) ≤ 6(M
G)3|S| = bG.
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Therefore all j0-winning strategy of Player −i which
minimizes the (j0+1)-th regret is j0-bounded by bG, and
a fortiori all j-winning strategy is also j0-bounded by bG,
for all j ≥ j0.
Lemma 15. Let i = 1, 2, j ≥ 0, λi ∈ P ji (G) and
λ
−i ∈ P
j
−i(G). Let o = Out
G(λi, λ−i). If o is win-
ning for Player i, µi(o) ≤ BG and µ−i(o) ≤ BG, then
uGi (λi, λ−i) = u
G′
i (Φ(λi),Φ(λ−i)).
Proof. If uG1 (λ1, λ2) ≤ B, then OutG(λ1, λ2) is win-
ning, and we let π = s0 . . . sn = OutG,C1(λ1, λ2). We let
π′ = (π0) . . . (πn) where for all k ≤ n, πk = s0 . . . sk.
Since π is bounded, πk ∈ PBG(G′). By definition of Φ
we clearly have π′ = OutG
′
(Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2)), from which
we get uG1 (λ1, λ2) = uG
′
1 (Φ(λ1),Φ(λn)).
If OutG
′
(Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2)) is winning for Player 1,
we let π′ = OutG
′,C′1(Φ(λ1),Φ(λ2)) and π =
last(π0) . . . last(πn) where π′ = π0 . . . πn. Clearly, π is
a winning play for Player 1 in G and by definition of Φ,
π = OutG,C1(λ1, λ2), from which we get the equality of
the utilities.
Lemma 16. For all i = 1, 2, all j ≥ 0. If Φ(P ji (G)) =
P ji (G
′) and there is a strategy j-bounded by bG in
P ji (G), then for all λ−i ∈ P j−i(G), brG,P
j
i
(G)
i (λ−i) =
brG
′,P
j
i
(G′)
i (Φ(λ−i)).
Proof. Let ηi ∈ P ji (G) be a strategy j-bounded by bG (it
exists by hypothesis), and let λ
−i ∈ P
j
−i(G). Since ηi is j-
bounded, it is j-winning and by Lemma 15, uGi (ηi, λ−i) =
uG
′
i (Φ(ηi),Φ(λ−i)). Therefore uG
′
i (Φ(ηi),Φ(λ−i)) <
+∞.
Let λi ∈ P ji (G) which minimizes br
G,P
j
i (G)
i (λ−i). Let
π = OutG,Ci(λi, λ−i). We have µi(π) ≤ uGi (ηi, λ−i) ≤
bG. Since the weights are strictly positive integers, |π| ≤
bG, and therefore µ
−i(π) ≤ b
GMG = BG. By Lemma
15, we get uGi (λi, λ−i) = uG
′
i (Φ(λi),Φ(λ−i). Therefore
uGi (λi, λ−i) = br
G,P
j
i
(G)
i (λ−i) ≥ br
G′,P
j
i
(G′)
i (Φ(λ−i)).
Conversely, let λ′i ∈ P
j
i (G
′) which minimizes
brG
′,P
j
i
(G′)
i (Φ(λ−i)). Therefore uG
′
i (λ
′
i,Φ(λ−i)) ≤
uG
′
i (Φ(ηi),Φ(λ−i)) < +∞. Since Φ(P
j
i (G)) =
P ji (G) by hypothesis, there exists λi ∈ P
j
i (G) such
that Φ(λi) = λ′i. Since uG
′
i (λ
′
i,Φ(λ−i)) is finite,
OutG
′
(λ′i,Φ(λ−i)) is winning for Player i. It is easy to
see that OutG,Ci(λi, λ−i) = last(π0) . . . last(πn) where
π0 . . . πn = OutG
′,C′i(λ′i,Φ(λ−i)) and that they both have
the same utility, i.e. uGi (λi, λ−i) = uG
′
i (λ
′
i,Φ(λ−i)).
Since uG′i (λ′i,Φ(λ−i)) = br
G′,P
j
i
(G′)
i (Φ(λ−i)), we get
brG
′,P
j
i (G
′)
i (Φ(λ−i)) ≥ br
G,P
j
i (G)
i (λ−i).
Lemma 17. For all j ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, λi ∈ P ji (G). If
Φ(P j
−i(G)) = P
j
−i(G
′), then λi is j-bounded by BG iff
Φ(λi) is j-winning. If λi is j-bounded by BG, then for all
λ
−i ∈ S
−i
j (G), u
G
i (λi, λ−i) = u
G′
i (Φ(λi),Φ(λ−i)).
Proof. If λi ∈ Λi(G) is j-bounded by BG. Then let
λ′
−i ∈ P
j
−i(G
′). Since Φ(P j
−i(G)) = P
j
−i(G
′), there ex-
ists λ
−i ∈ P
j
−i(G) such that Φ(λ−i) = λ′−i. Since λi is
j-bounded, we are in the condition of Lemma 15, there-
fore uGi (λi, λ−i) = uG
′
i (Φ(λi), λ
′
−i) < +∞. Therefore
Φ(λi) wins against λ′
−i.
Conversely, if Φ(λi) is j-winning, then let λ−i ∈
P j
−i(G). By hypothesis, Φ(λ−i) ∈ P
j
−i(G
′). There-
fore Φ(λi) wins against Φ(λ−i). Let π0 . . . πn =
OutG
′,C′i(Φ(λi),Φ(λ−i)). Clearly, by definition of Φ
and G′, λi wins against λ−i and OutG,Ci(λi, λ−i) =
last(π0) . . . last(πn).
Lemma 18. ∀j ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, 2, if Φ(P ji (G)) = P jj (G′)
then:
(i) regG,j+1i = +∞ iff regG
′,j+1
i = +∞
(ii) ∀λi ∈ P
j+1
i (G) ∪ Φ
−1(P j+1i (G
′)),
regG,j+1i (λi) = reg
G′,j+1
i (Φ(λi))
(iii) Φ(P j+1i (G)) = P
j+1
i (G
′)
Proof. (i) If regG,j+1i < +∞, then it means that
there is a j-winning strategy λi ∈ P ij (G). By
Lemma 17, Φ(λi) is j-winning. Since by hypothe-
sis, Φ(P ij (G)) = P ij (G′), Φ(λi) ∈ P ij (G′), so that
regG
′,j+1
i ≤ reg
G′,j+1
i (Φ(λi)) < +∞.
Conversely, if regG
′,j+1
i < +∞, there is a j-winning
strategy λ′i ∈ P ij (G′). By hypothesis, there is λi ∈ P ij (G)
such that Φ(λi) = λ′i, and by Lemma 17, λi is j-bounded,
and in particular j-winning. Therefore regG,j+1i < +∞.
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(ii) The proof is in two parts, depending on whether
regG,j+1i is finite or not.
(ii).a If regG,j+1i = +∞, then by (i), regG
′,j+1
i =
+∞.
Let λi ∈ P j+1i (G). Since P
j+1
i (G) ⊆ P
i
j (G), λi ∈
P ij (G). By hypothesis, Φ(P ij (G)) = P ij (G′), therefore
Φ(λi) ∈ P
i
j (G
′). Therefore regG
′,j+1
i (Φ(λi)) = +∞ =
regG,j+1i (λi).
If λi ∈ Φ−1(P j+1i (G′)), then reg
G,j+1
i (Φ(λi)) =
+∞. Since P j+1i (G′) ⊆ P ij (G′), Φ(λi) ∈ P ij (G′). By
hypothesis, Φ(P ij (G)) = P ij (G′), therefore λi ∈ P ij (G),
and regG,j+1i (λi) = +∞ = reg
G,j+1
i (Φ(λi)), since
regG,j+1i = +∞.
(ii).b If regG,j+1i < +∞, then by (i), regG
′,j+1
i <
+∞. Let λi ∈ P j+1i (G) ∪ Φ−1(P
j+1
i (G
′)). We prove
that for all λ
−i ∈ P
j
−i(G),
1. uGi (λi, λ−i) = uG
′
i (Φ(λi),Φ(λ−i)
2. brG,P
i
j (G)
i (λ−i) = br
G′,P ij (G
′)
i (Φ(λ−i))
For 1, If λi ∈ P j+1i (G), then since reg
G,j+1
i < +∞,
by Lemma 11, λi is j-bounded by bG, and a fortiori
by BG. By Lemma 17, we get the result. If λi ∈
Φ−1(P j+1i (G
′)), then since regG
′,j+1
i < +∞, Φ(λi) ∈
P ji (G
′) is necessarily winning. By Lemma 17, λi is j-
bounded by BG and again by the same lemma, we get the
result.
For 2, since regG,j+1i < +∞, by Lemma 11, there is
a strategy of Player i j-bounded by BG in P ij (G). There-
fore we can apply Lemma 16 and we get the result.
Finally we have:
regG,j+1i (λi)
= max
λ
−i∈P
j
−i
(G)
[uGi (λi, λ−i)− br
G,P ij (G)
i (λ−i)]
= max
λ
−i∈P
j
−i
(G)
[uG
′
i (Φ(λi),Φ(λ−i))− br
G,P ij (G)
i (Φ(λ−i))]
(by (1) and (2))
= max
λ′
−i
∈P j
−i
(G′)
[uG
′
i (Φ(λi), λ
′
−i)− br
G′,P ij (G
′)
i (λ
′
−i)]
(since Φ(P ij (G)) = P ij (G′) by hypothesis)
= regG
′,j+1
i (Φ(λi))
(iii) Let i ∈ {1, 2} and λi ∈ Sij+1(G). Sup-
pose that Φ(λi) 6∈ Sij+1(G′). It means that Φ(λi)
does not minimize the j + 1-th regret in G′. There-
fore there exists another strategy λ′i ∈ P
j+1
i (G
′) such
that regG
′,j+1
i (λ
′
i) < regG,j+1i (Φ(λi)). By (i), we get
regG,j+1i (γi) < reg
G,j+1
i (λi), for all γi ∈ Φ−1(λ′i).
Since P j+1i (G′) ⊆ P
j
i (G
′) and Φ(P ij (G)) = P ij (G′),
we have Φ−1(λ′i) ⊆ P ij (G), and we get a contradiction
on the minimality of λi.
Conversely, let λ′i ∈ P
j+1
i (G
′). Suppose that λ′i 6∈
Φ(P j+1i (G)). Since λ′i ∈ P
j
i (G
′), by hypothesis, λ′i ∈
Φ(P ij (G)). Therefore there exists λi ∈ P ij (G) such that
Φ(λi) = λ
′
i, but λi 6∈ P
j+1
i (G). It means that λi did not
survive to the j-th iteration. In other words, for all strat-
egy γi ∈ P j+1i (G), reg
G,j+1
i (γi) < reg
G,j+1
i (λi). Since
λi ∈ Φ
−1(P j+1i (G
′)), by (ii) we have regG,j+1i (λi) =
regG
′,j+1
i (Φ(λi)) = reg
G′,j+1
i (λ
′
i). By (ii), we also
have regG,j+1i (γi) = reg
G′,j+1
i (Φ(γi)). Therefore
regG
′,j+1
i (Φ(γi)) < reg
G′,j+1
i (λ
′
i). Since γi ∈ P ij (G)
and by hypothesis, Φ(P ij (G)) = P ij (G′), we have
Φ(γi) ∈ P
i
j (G
′). Therefore we get a strategy Φ(γi)
of P ij (G′) with a lower (j + 1)-th regret than the (j +
1)-regret of λ′i. This is in contradiction with λ′i ∈
P j+1i (G
′).
Lemma 13
Proof. Clearly, Φ(Λi(G)) = Λi(G′). Therefore we can
apply Lemma 18 (proved in Appendix) so that items (i),
(ii) and (iii) holds at rank 0. In particular, Φ(P 1i (G)) =
P 1i (G
′). Therefore we can again apply Lemma 18 at rank
1. More generally, for all j ≥ 1, we have:
1. for all λi ∈ P ij (G), regG,ji (λi) = reg
G′,j
i (Φ(λi));
2. Φ(P ij (G)) = P ij (G′).
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